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Abstract 
 
This paper studies the design of a nonlinear social security scheme in a society where 
individuals differ in two respects: productivity and degree of myopia. Myopic individuals 
may not save "enough" for their retirement because their "myopic self" emerges when 
labor supply and savings decisions are made. The social welfare function is paternalistic: 
the rate of time preference of the far-sighted (which corresponds to the "true" preferences 
of the myopics) is used for both types. We show that the paternalistic solution does not 
necessarily imply forced savings for the myopics. This is because paternalistic 
considerations are mitigated or even outweighed by incentive effects. Our numerical 
results suggest that as the number of myopic individuals increases, there is less 
redistribution and more forced saving. Furthermore, as the number of myopic increases, 
the desirability of social security (measured by the difference between social welfare with 
and without social security) increases. 
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1 Introduction
Social security systems typically fulfill several functions. They force myopic individuals
(who are inclined to save less than what is reasonable given their life expectancy) to
save an appropriate amount. They also contribute to redistributing resources. Finally,
they provide insurance, in particular for the longevity risks by providing an annuity.
In this paper we focus on the first two functions. The “forced saving” argument is
rarely disputed. What is disputed is whether one needs social security to ensure that
everyone saves enough; after all the government needs only to require that individuals
save the desired amount. This would be a valid objection if first-best redistribution
were available. However, in a world of asymmetric information, where productivity
and degree of myopia are not publicly observable there may well be a case for a social
security scheme that pursues both functions.
We adopt a two-period model: individuals work in the first period and retire in the
second. They save part of their earnings for their consumption in retirement. Individ-
uals differ in two respects, productivity on the one hand and degree of myopia on the
other hand. Myopic individuals may not save “enough” for their retirement because
their “myopic self” emerges when labor supply and savings decisions are made. In other
words, they use a discount factor which does not reflect their “true” preferences.1 When
they retire, they regret their earlier decisions. Consequently, if they could be forced to
save a certain amount, they would be in favor of such an imposed commitment. We
assume that the government has a paternalistic view and wants to help these individ-
uals to overcome their myopia problem; in measuring social welfare it uses the rate of
time preference of the individuals whose myopic self never emerges. Ex post, myopic
individuals will be grateful to the government for such forced saving.
In our model, both productivity and time preference are not observable. The gov-
ernment will design a tax transfer policy based on what is observable: gross earnings,
disposable income and saving.
Anticipating the results, we show that the paternalistic solution does not necessar-
1For earlier work on this, see Feldstein (1985), Imrohoroglu et al. (2003) and recently Diamond and
Koszegi (2003).
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ily imply forced savings for the myopics. This is because paternalistic considerations
are mitigated or even outweighed by incentive effects. In other words, the interaction
between paternalism and redistribution is rather complex and may bring about results
which are in contradiction to conventional wisdom. Our numerical results suggest that
as the number of myopic individuals increases, there is less redistribution and more
forced saving. Furthermore, as the number of myopic increases, the desirability of so-
cial security (measured by the difference between social welfare with and without social
security) increases.
This paper is part of an ongoing research on social security and myopia. It focuses
on non-linear schemes. In companion papers, Cremer et al. (2007a, 2007b), we study
the same problem using a linear schedule and taking both a normative and a positive
viewpoint.2
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The basic model is introduced in the
next section. Then the second-best optimum is discussed. Finally, Section 4 provides
numerical simulations.
2 The model
2.1 Myopic and farsighted individuals
Individuals’ utility is given by
U(ci, di, li) = u(ci) + βu(di)− v(`i), (1)
where ci and di are first- and second-period consumption while `i is labor supplied in
the first period. Observe that we can think of `i as the retirement age. Gross earnings
are given by yi = wi`i and are obtained in the first period. Individuals differ in their
wage rate, wi ∈ {wL, wH} with wL < wH . Individuals can save part of first period
income at a zero intererest rate.
For all individuals the “true” time-discount factor is given by β. However not all
individuals will make their labor supply and consumption decisions according to this
2While we were completing this paper, we came across a related paper by Tenhunen and Tuomala
(2006) who also design an optimal social security non-linear scheme where far-sighted and myopic
coexist.
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Figure 1: Types of individuals
parameter. For some individuals, their “myopic self” emerges when labor supply and
saving are chosen. They take all decisions according to a time discount parameter
β0 < β. Formally, savings and labor supply are chosen according to
Ui(ci, di, li) = u(ci) + βiu(di)− v(`i). (2)
For myopic individuals we have βi = β0, while βi = β holds for the far-sighted.
To sum up, there are four types of individuals as represented on Figure 1. Type-1 and
type-3 individuals’ are the far-sighted with low and high abilities respectively. Type-2
(low ability) and type-4 (high ability) individuals on the other hand are myopic. Total
population size is normalized at one and the proportion of type i = 1, . . . , 4 individuals
is denoted by pii.
2.2 First-best solution
We take a paternalistic approach and consider the utilitarian optimum based on indi-
viduals’ true preferences. The corresponding Lagrangian expression is given by
LFB =
∑
i
pii
[
u (ci) + βu (di)− v
(
yi
wi
)]
− µ
∑
i
pii (ci + di − yi) .
3
This yields
c1 = c2 = c3 = c4,
d1 = d2 = d3 = d4,
`1 = `2 < `3 = `4.
With separable preferences the utilitarian solution implies that consumption levels are
equalized across types and periods and that the able individuals work more than the
unable. This first-best allocation can be decentralized by using two instruments. First,
we need lump-sum transfers to redistribute from high to low productivity individuals.
In addition a “Pigouvian” (corrective) subsidy at rate 1 − β0/β on the savings of the
myopics is required to induce them to save the appropriate amount. As an alternative
to the savings subsidy, one can also use a pension scheme to force myopics individuals
to save.
3 Second best solution with nonlinear schemes
In reality this solution may not be feasible because some key variables are not publicly
observable. We adopt the standard assumption in the Mirrlees’ model of optimal income
taxation according to which an individual’s wage and labor supply are not observable,
while gross earnings yi = wi`i are observable. In addition we assume that an individual’s
degree of myopia is not observable either. We assume for simplicity that saving is
observable so that the (possibly nonlinear) pension benefits scheme is based on both
yi and si. The case where saving is not observable is more complicated but yields the
same main results.3
To interpret the properties of the optimal allocations derived below, let us now look
at the problem of implementing a given allocation.
3A technical appendix analyzing this case is available from the authors (or can be found on Helmuth
Cremer’s webpage at www.idei.fr). Yet another specification is to assume that the tax on savings is
restricted to be linear (because only anonymous transactions are observable). One can show that any
allocation that can be achieved with observable savings can also be implemented with a linear tax. To
do this it is sufficient to set a very high tax rate so that private savings is completely crowded out and
to control second period consumption through the pensions scheme.
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3.1 Implementation
Recall that the government observes si and yi and can tax the individuals non-linearly
on the basis of these two variables. The policy instruments are T (yi, si) and p(yi, si)
corresponding to the payroll tax and the pension benefit, respectively. Taking these two
policy instruments into account the individual problem is given by
max
yi,si
u(yi − si − T (yi, si)) + βiu(si + p(yi, si))− v
(
yi
wi
)
,
with the first-order conditions
u′(ci)
u′(di)
= βi
1 + ps(yi, si)
1 + Ts(yi, si)
, (3)
v′(li)
u′(ci)
= wi
(
1− Ty(yi, si) + 1 + Ts(yi, si)1 + ps(yi, si)py(yi, si)
)
. (4)
Define
Θi = 1− 1 + ps(yi, si)1 + Ts(yi, si) =
Ts(yi, si)− ps(yi, si)
1 + Ts(yi, si)
, (5)
Γi = Ty(yi, si)− 1 + Ts(yi, si)1 + ps(yi, si)py(yi, si), (6)
which represent the implicit marginal tax (or subsidy) on savings and on labor implied
by the tax and pension schemes. When Θi < (>)0 type-i individual faces a marginal
subsidy (tax) on savings. When Γi > 0 type-i individual faces a marginal tax on income.
These two wedges have been widely discussed in the theoretical and empirical lit-
erature on social security. Early retirement that is observed in many OECD countries
is often explained by a positive Γi called the implicit tax on prolonged activity. Recall
that `i can be considered here as determining the activity rate or even the retirement
age of type i individuals.4 Insufficient saving for retirement is also often explained by
the presence of an implicit tax on saving and the aim of tax breaks for retirement saving
is to generate a negative Θi.
In this paper we are interested by the design of a social security system summarized
by the functions T and p. Such a system can be approached in two ways. First, we
4In other words, people would work for ` years and would retire thereafter.
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can look at net lifetime benefit which are given by −T (yi, si) + p(yi, si).5 Alternatively,
we can concentrate on (dis)incentives to work and save and study the sign of marginal
taxes Θi and Γi. Analytically, we can only deal with the latter. To study the former,
we will have to resort to numerical examples.
3.2 Second-best solution
With the considered information structure feasible allocations must satisfy a set of
incentive constraints that take the following form
u(ci) + βiu(di)− v
(
yi
wi
)
≥ u(cj) + βiu(dj)− v
(
yj
wi
)
, (7)
The Lagrangian (Kuhn-Tucker) expression associated with the second-best problem is
given by
LSB =
∑
i
pii
[
u (ci) + βu (di)− v
(
yi
wi
)
− µ (ci + di − yi)
]
+
∑
i6=j
λij
[
u (ci) + βiu (di)− v
(
yi
wi
)
− u (cj)− βiu (dj) + v
(
yj
wi
)]
,
where λij ≥ 0 are the multipliers associated with the self-selection constraints where
the first subscript denotes the mimicker and the second the mimicked.
The FOCs for this problem are
∂LSB
∂ci
=
pii + ∑
j:i6=j
λij −
∑
j:i6=j
λji
u′(ci)− piiµ = 0, (8)
∂LSB
∂di
=
βpii + ∑
j:i6=j
βiλij −
∑
j:i6=j
βjλji
u′(di)− piiµ = 0, (9)
∂LSB
∂yi
=−
pii + ∑
j:i6=j
λij
 v′( yi
wi
)
1
wi
+
∑
j:i6=j
λjiv
′
(
yi
wj
)
1
wj
+ piiµ = 0. (10)
5Recall that the interest rate is zero.
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Note that to have an interior solutions for ci and di we need
pii +
∑
j:i6=j
λij −
∑
j:i6=j
λji > 0, (11)
βpii +
∑
j:i6=j
βiλij −
∑
j:i6=j
βjλji > 0. (12)
to be satisfied. We will need these conditions for our further analysis.
The FOCs can be rearranged to yield
v′
(
yi
wi
)
u′(ci)
= wi
pii +
∑
j:i6=j λij −
∑
j:i6=j λji
pii +
∑
j:i6=j λij −
∑
j:i6=j λji
v′

yi
wj

1
wj
v′

yi
wi

1
wi
,
u′(ci)
u′(di)
= βi
pii +
∑
j:i6=j λij −
∑
j:i6=j
βj
βi
λji
pii +
∑
j:i6=j λij −
∑
j:i6=j λji
+
pii (β − βi)
pii +
∑
j:i6=j λij −
∑
j:i6=j λji
.
When individuals differ in more than one characteristic, nonlinear taxation prob-
lems are often rather difficult. This is due to the difficulty of knowing a priori which
are the incentive constraints that bind. One possible approach is to solve the model
without making any assumptions about the pattern of binding incentive constraints and
analyze the general formulas obtained; this strategy has been adopted by Cremer et al.
(2001) within the context of commodity taxation. Our approach here is different. We
concentrate on specific patterns of binding incentive constraints, namely on those that
arise in the numerical simulations provided below.6 In addition, we assume for the time
being that pi2 = 0. In other words there are no myopic low-wage individuals in the
economy.7 This assumption can once again be justified by the simulation results which
show that the optimal utilitarian allocation always pools type-1 and type-2 individuals
(c1 = c2, d1 = d2 and `1 = `2).On the basis of the numerical simulations, we consider
the two patterns of binding incentive constraints that have emerged:
1. λ34 > 0, λ41 > 0 and λ31 > 0, while λij = 0 for all other constraints,
6We have run a large number of simulations and we have not been able to find a counter-example
(which does of course not imply that such a counterexample does not exist).
7We can also think of an alternative three types case in which we have myopic and far-sighted low-
ability individuals on the one hand and far-sighted high-ability individuals on the other hand. In this
case the problem is equivalent to the Atkinson-Stiglitz problem (at least with a utilitarian objective).
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2. λ34 > 0 and λ41 > 0, while λij = 0 for all other constraints.8
When the binding incentive constraints are those associated with the Lagrange mul-
tipliers λ34, λ41 and λ31 one easily checks (by combining the three constraints) that
d4 = d1. In the other case, when the binding incentive constraints are associated with
λ34 and λ41, we have d1 < d4. In both cases the first order conditions (8)-(10) can be
rearranged as follows (with λ31 = 0 for the second case)
v′ (`3)
u′ (c3)
= wH , (13)
u′ (c3)
u′ (d3)
= β, (14)
v′ (`4)
u′ (c4)
= wH , (15)
u′(c4)
u′(d4)
= β0
pi4 + λ41 − ββ0λ34
pi4 + λ41 − λ34 +
pi4(β − β0)
pi4 + λ41 − λ34 , (16)
v′ (`1)
u′ (c1)
= wL
pi1 − λ31 − λ41
pi1 + [λ31 + λ41]
v′(y1/wH)
v′(y1/wL)
wL
wH
, (17)
u′ (c1)
u′ (d1)
= β
pi1 − λ31 − β0β λ41
pi1 − λ31 − λ41 . (18)
From these expressions we can conclude that the marginal (labor) income taxes
satisfy the usual properties: zero marginal tax rates for both high ability individuals
(Γ3 = Γ4 = 0) and positive income marginal tax rate for low ability individuals (Γ1 > 0).
This is not surprising and not directly related to this paper’s main focus.9
Our main focus is on the marginal taxation of savings. This distortion can be
interpreted in two ways depending on the way the solution is implemented. The im-
plementation considered in Subsection (3.1) relies on a nonlinear taxation of private
saving which is in line with standard optimal tax models. However, one can also think
about a direct control of second period consumption d through the pension benefits
(with no private savings at all). And of course any intermediate scheme between these
two extremes is conceivable. Now, when we adopt the pension scheme interpretation,
8Recall that in a Kuhn-Tucker problem λij > 0 means that the associated constraint is binding.
9It might appear surprising at first that Γ4 = 0 even though λ34 > 0. In other words, type 4 is not a
“top” individual in the usual sense (an incentive constraint toward 4 is binding). However, types 3 and
4 have the same wage, so that nothing can be gained by distorting the mimicked type’s labor supply.
8
a marginal subsidy on “savings” effectively means that the pension system forces indi-
viduals to save more than they would otherwise do. One would expect such a forced
saving to occur for the myopic individual. However, the results show that the problem
is more complex and that there may be several contradicting effects.
Using the FOCs for the second best solution (14, 16 and 18) and the equations that
define Θi (3 and 5), we obtain the following expressions:
Θ3 = 0 (19)
Θ4 =
β − β0
β0
λ34
pi4 + λ41 − λ34 −
β − β0
β0
pi4
pi4 + λ41 − λ34 (20)
Θ1 = −β − β0
β0
λ34
pi1 − λ31 − λ41 (21)
Conditions (11) and (12), which are needed to have an interior optimum imply that the
denominators of all fractions in the previous expressions are positive. This is useful to
study the sign of the marginal taxes faced by type-4 and type-1 individuals.
Equation (19) means that high-ability far-sighted individuals face no distortion on
their savings (they face a zero marginal tax rate). Equation (21) implies Θ1 < 0 which
means that low-ability (far-sighted) individuals’ savings are subsidized.
Turning to the myopic (type 4), the analysis of Θ becomes much more interesting.
Intuitively, one might expect Θ4 < 0 so that the system forces these individuals to
save. Interestingly, however, it turn out that Θ4 can be positive as well as negative
as can be seen from (20). Which case occurs depends on the sign of pi4 − λ34; when
pi4 − λ34 > (<)0 Θ4 is negative (positive). This can be understood by subjecting the
first order conditions to closer scrutiny. Consider the two terms in the right hand-side
of (20). The first term is equivalent to the capital income tax term that appears in a
setting in which the government is not paternalistic (for instance Cremer et al., 2003
or Stiglitz, 1985) and is an incentive related distortion (intended to relax an otherwise
binding self-selection constraint). With β > β0 it follows that this term is positive so
that a non-paternalistic planner would tax savings of the high-ability myopic individual.
Put differently, this term calls for a downward distortion on second period consumption
of the myopic individual.
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The second term captures the paternalistic motive of the planner. It can be seen
as a Pigouvian (corrective) term and with β > β0 it calls for a subsidy (reduced tax)
on savings. Observe that this term vanishes when β0 → β in which case individuals
are no longer myopic. This second term captures the intuitively expected forced-saving
aspect of pensions but the overall effect is ambiguous because there is a conflict with
the incentive terms.
At this point we have shown that (20) has two conflicting terms that may imply
taxes or subsidies on savings of the high-ability myopic individuals. To show that the
expression is ambiguous we also have to show that both cases are effectively possible. To
make this point numerical examples are sufficient and this is done in the next section.
However an analytical argument is also useful in that it provides some extra intuition.
In fact what is important to show is that a subsidy can really take place since Cremer
et al., 2003 have already shown the possibility of taxing the savings of the myopic (with
a non-paternalistic planner).10
To prove this we show that Θ4 < 0 when β0 → 0. This is because as β0 → 0,
β(pi4 − λ34) ≥ 011 which in turn implies Θ4 < 0. This is not surprising. When the bias
towards present consumption is such that myopic individuals simply would not make
any savings (if left to their own), it is always desirable to force these individuals to save.
In this case the Pigouvian term always dominates.
The numerical simulations in the next section confirm this and show that a positive
Θ4 may take place when β0 is high. Observe that in any case the under-savings problem
of the myopics is never fully corrected; i.e. we always have u′(c4)/u′(d4) < β.
4 Numerical results
We now turn to numerical simulations. They provide illustration of the analytical
results. In addition, they are useful to study some issues that cannot be dealt with
analytically. In particular, they show how the presence of myopic individuals (and a
10A continuity argument regarding the degree of paternalism would be enough to show that in our
setting taxing the savings of the myopic is possible.
11This follows from (12) which in this case implies β(pi4 − λ34) ≥ −β0λ41 and from noticing that the
right hand side tends to zero when β0 tends to zero.
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Table 1: Basic parameters
wL = 4 wH = 8 Relative share
β = 1 type-1 type-3 1− δ
β0 = 0.2 or 0.8 type-2 type-4 δ
Relative share 0.6 0.4 1
variation in their share) affects welfare and the design of the tax and pension system.
The comparison between an all myopic and an all far-sighted society should not be
too difficult. One expects that the role of the government is more important in the
all-myopic case because it then pursues two objectives: achieving more equality and
fostering savings. In a far-sighted society, on the other hand, the role of the government
is purely redistributive. At the same time, the task of the government is more difficult
in the all myopic case. Can we expect monotonicity between those two polar cases?
The simulations are based on the following utility function
u(ci, di, `i) =
√
ci + βi
√
di − (`i)2,
with a distribution of types as indicated in Table 1.
The scenarios we consider differ in the share of myopic individuals (in total popu-
lation). Observe that the share of high-ability individuals is constant and the same for
the myopic and the far-sighted groups. Productivities are given by wH = 8 and wL = 4.
The far-sighted have a β = 1 and the myopic a β0 = 0.2 or 0.8. When β0 = 0.2, we
expect that the difference in time preference dominates that in productivity and when
β0 = 0.8, the productivity gap should dominate.
Tables 2 and 3 show the laissez-faire solution and the paternalistic first-best. In the
laissez-faire we distinguish the case of β0 = 0.2 and 0.8. In the paternalistic first-best
the time discount factor of the myopic does not count. In these tables, we distinguish
two levels of utility for the myopic: the utility perceived in the first-period with β0
(denoted by Ui) and the ex post utility with β (denoted by U˜i).
Figures 2 and 3 depict the level of social welfare in the laissez-faire as a function of
11
Table 2: Laissez-faire
β0 = 0.2
Type ci di `i Ui U˜i
1 1.587 1.587 0.794 1.890 1.890
2 2.455 0.098 0.638 1.222 1.473
3 4.000 4.000 1.000 3.000 3.000
4 6.186 0.247 0.804 1.940 2.338
β0 = 0.8
Type ci di `i Ui U˜i
1 1.587 1.587 0.794 1.890 1.890
2 1.812 1.160 0.743 1.656 1.871
3 4.000 4.000 1.000 3.000 3.000
4 4.566 2.922 0.936 2.628 2.970
Table 3: First-best
Type ci di `i Ui Ui U˜i
β0 = 0, 2 β0 = 0, 8
1 2.685 2.685 0.610 2.905 2.905 2.905
2 2.685 2.685 0.610 1.594 2.577 2.905
3 2.685 2.685 1.221 1.788 1.788 1.788
4 2.685 2.685 1.221 0.477 1.460 1.788
Welfare 2.458
the proportion of myopic individuals. Not surprisingly, it decreases particularly when
β0 = 0.2.
We now turn to the second-best solution for different values of δ. Keeping in mind
that the first-best welfare is independent of δ, we see from Table 5 and Figures 2–3 that
social welfare decreases with δ, particularly with β0 = 0.2. The relation between δ and
the gap between welfare in the Second-best and in the Laissez-faire is also instructive;
the same figures show that this gap increases as δ increases showing that the desirability
of social security increases with δ. When δ increases, the difference between second and
first-period consumption (di − ci) of both types of poor individuals and of the myopic
rich individuals steadily increases. In other words, myopia not only brings about forced
saving, but the degree of forced saving also increases with the share of myopics.
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Figure 2: Welfare as a function of δ when β0 = 0.2
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Figure 3: Welfare as a function of δ when β0 = 0.8
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Table 4a: Second-best solution with β0 = 0.2
Type ci di `i −Ti + pi Ui U˜i Γi Θi
δ=0 1 1.838 1.838 0.662 1,028 2.273 2.273 0.102 0.000
3 3.503 3.503 1.069 -1,546 2.602 2.602 0.000 0.000
δ=0.1 1 1.771 1.904 0.667 1,007 2.266 2.266 0.113 -0.037
2 1.771 1.904 0.667 1,007 1.163 2.266 0.113 -4.184
3 3.501 3.501 1.069 -1,550 2.600 2.600 0.000 0.000
4 4.471 1.904 0.946 -1,193 1.496 2.600 0.000 -2.263
δ=0.5 1 1.569 2.122 0.681 0,967 2.245 2.245 0.147 -0.163
2 1.569 2.122 0.681 0,967 1.080 2.245 0.147 -4.816
3 3.493 3.493 1.070 -1,574 2.593 2.593 0.000 0.000
4 4.285 2.122 0.966 -1,321 1.428 2.593 0.000 -2.519
δ=0.9 1 1.448 2.140 0.691 0,824 2.188 2.188 0.168 -0.216
2 1.448 2.140 0.691 0,824 1.018 2.188 0.168 -5.079
3 3.564 3.564 1.059 -1,344 2.653 2.653 0.000 0.000
4 4.116 2.547 0.986 -1,225 1.376 2.653 0.000 -2.933
δ=1 2 1.430 2.132 0.693 0,790 1.008 2.176 0.172 -5.105
4 4.087 2.641 0.989 -1,184 1.368 2.668 0.000 -3.020
Table 4b: Second-best solution with β0 = 0.8.
Type ci di `i −Ti + pi Ui U˜i Γi Θi
δ=0.1 1 1.772 1.894 0.667 0,998 2.263 2.263 0.113 -0.034
2 1.772 1.894 0.667 0,998 1.988 2.263 0.113 -0.292
3 3.507 3.507 1.068 -1,530 2.605 2.605 0.000 0.000
4 4.393 2.014 0.954 -1,225 2.321 2.605 0.000 0.154
δ=0.5 1 1.728 1.855 0.670 0,903 2.228 2.228 0.120 -0.036
2 1.728 1.855 0.670 0,903 1.955 2.228 0.120 -0.295
3 3.560 3.560 1.060 -1,360 2.650 2.650 0.000 0.000
4 3.733 3.201 1.035 -1,346 2.292 2.650 0.000 -0.158
δ=0.9 1 1.722 1.850 0.670 0,892 2.223 2.223 0.120 -0.036
2 1.722 1.850 0.670 0,892 1.951 2.223 0.120 -0.296
3 3.566 3.566 1.059 -1,340 2.655 2.655 0.000 0.000
4 3.662 3.363 1.045 -1,335 2.288 2.655 0.000 -0.198
δ=1 2 1.722 1.850 0.670 0,892 1.951 2.223 0.120 -0.296
4 3.653 3.383 1.046 -0,877 2.288 2.656 0.000 -0.203
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Table 5: Welfare and utility gap in the second-best
β0 = 0.2 β0 = 0.8
δ Welfare U˜3 − U˜1 Welfare U˜3 − U˜1
0,02 2,4035 0,3296 2,4035 0,3296
0,05 2,4021 0,3310 2,4021 0,3310
0,10 2,3997 0,3332 2,3997 0,3418
0,20 2,3953 0,3374 2,3977 0,3906
0,50 2,3843 0,3482 2,3964 0,4220
0,70 2,3784 0,3922 2,3961 0,4281
0,90 2,3744 0,4648 2,3960 0,4316
0,95 2,3736 0,4790 2,3960 0,4323
0,98 2,3731 0,4870 2,3960 0,4326
Concerning redistribution, we observe that the utility gap between the poor and the
rich individuals increases with δ as it is shown by Table 5. Similarly the net lifetime
benefits that the poor individuals receive are also decreasing in the proportion of myopic
individuals as the column −Ti + pi in Tables 4a and 4b show. Consequently, the poor
workers are penalized by the presence of myopic individuals. In other words, myopia
implies a less redistributive tax and pension system. Not surprisingly those effects are
stronger with β0 = 0.2 (when myopia is more severe) than with β0 = 0.8.
Marginal taxes are consistent with the analytical results. Consider first the distortion
in labor supply (measured by Γi). There is no such distortion for types 3 and 4, namely
the productive individuals. For types 1 and 2, the unskilled workers, there is a positive
and identical marginal tax which increases as δ decreases. Turning to the saving choice,
things are different. First, only type 3, the far-sighted skilled workers, are not subject
to distortion. The others are subject to a subsidy that is particularly high for type 2
(myopic and unskilled) when β0 = 0.2.When β = 0.8, that is when the degree of myopia
is small, the implicit subsidies are also small. Types 1 and (to a more significant extent)
2 are subject to a subsidy but for δ = 0.10, type 3 is subject to a tax. Observe that the
tax-subsidy rate is different for all types.
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5 Conclusion
This paper has studied the design of an optimal non linear social security scheme in a
setting where individuals differ in both productivity and myopia and where the govern-
ment acts paternalistically in attributing to all individuals the same far-sighted time
preferences. The main analytical result we obtain is that the paternalistic utilitarian
solution does not necessarily imply forced savings for the myopics. While the Pigou-
vian (corrective) term calls for such forced saving, it is mitigated (or outweighed) by
an incentive term which calls for a tax on savings (inducing a reduction in savings).
Our numerical results suggest that as the number of myopic individuals increases, there
is less redistribution and more forced saving. Furthermore, as the number of myopic
agents increases, the desirability of social security (measured by the difference between
social welfare with and without social security) increases.
In two companion papers, we have examined the same issue restricting government
intervention to linear schemes studied both from a normative point of view (Cremer
et al. 2007b) and in a political economy setting (Cremer et al. 2007a). Each of these
studies sheds light on the same underlying issue but from a different perspective. A
basic lesson that emerges from the three papers is that the interplay between redistrib-
ution and forced saving is both complex and interesting. In the absence of myopia, the
problem would be “straightforward” (we have a standard Mirrlees problem); without
heterogeneity in wage, it would be trivial (the first-best can easily be achieved). Com-
bining these two features brings about an intricate interaction which yields some rather
counterintuitive results.
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